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Abstract— It has been calculated the value of the 
preference margin granted to Euro-Mediterranean 
partners in the cases of reduced entry prices in force, 
and then it has been simulated the impact of EU trade 
liberalisation for F&V on such values after two different 
alternatives of EP system variations resulting from a 
WTO agreement. The results of current preferences 
indicate that in monetary terms there is only a 
significant relevance of the preferential EPs in the case 
of Moroccan tomatoes and, to a lesser extent, in 
Moroccan clementines. Very little is the relevance for 
Jordanian tomatoes and cucumbers and Moroccan 
courgettes, cucumbers and artichokes. In the cases of 
oranges from Egypt, Morocco, Israel and Jordan, 
preferential EP has not meant potential monetary 
transfers to these preference-receiver countries. Instead, 
the ad valorem tariff exoneration seems crucial in almost 
all the products. With regard to the erosion of 
preferences as a result of a WTO agreement, the 
magnitude of the erosion depends crucially on the 
variation/no-variation of the current trigger EPs, and 
the undermining of preferences is concentrated mostly 
on Moroccan tomatoes. 
Keywords— Entry prices, erosion of trade 
preferences, Euro-Mediterranean trade, fruits and 
vegetables. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The EU grants reduced entry price (EP) for a 
limited number of products imported from several 
Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs). The value 
of preference margin with reduced EP (VPMEP) has 
been applied to assess the potential transfers granted 
by the EU in these cases. This indicator has been also 
used to assess the erosion of trade preferences after a 
multilateral agreement that varies the current EP 
system. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II 
summarises the EP system and indicates the current 
cases of reduced EPs granted to SMCs, while in 
section III it is explained the indicator developed to 
assess the preferences for such cases. Section IV gives 
the results of such indicator to the current situation, 
while section V discusses about the erosion of 
preferences as a result of a change in the EP system. 
The last section of the paper highlights the main 
findings and conclusions drawn from the analysis.  
II. THE EP SYSTEM AND PREFERENCES 
INVOLVING REDUCED EP 
Since 1995, the EU protects some of its fruits and 
vegetables through the EP system. This system is 
implemented for “sensitive” products which are often 
crucial for the exports of SMCs like tomatoes, 
cucumbers and citrus fruits. In many cases, the system 
applies on a seasonal basis, remaining the protection 
for a part of the year through the “usual” tariff system. 
The EP system and the differences with its 
predecessor have been discussed by Swinbank and 
Ritson [1] and Tangermann [2]. The system consists 
on a two-tiered tariff. When the border price of 
exports to the EU is above the EP level (also called 
trigger EP), they must pay an ad valorem tariff, 
whereas exports priced below the trigger EP must pay 
a supplementary specific tariff after being levied by 
the ad valorem tariff. The amount of the specific tariff 
depends on the relationship between the trigger EP 
and the border price for the shipment: the cheaper is 
the product, the higher is the specific tariff applied, 
being the aim to prevent the entry of cheap products 
that may affect market competitiveness of EU 
productions. Thus, when the rate [border price to 
trigger EP] ranges between 92% and 100%, the 
exporter pays the difference between them (rounded in 
2% steps). If the rate is lesser than 92%, it must be   2 
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paid the maximum tariff equivalent (MTE) for the 
product according to WTO commitments. 
Cioffi and dell’Aquilla [3] analyse the effects of the 
EP system on exports of apples, tomatoes and oranges 
from different countries to the EU and state, among 
others, that the MTE acts virtually as a prohibitive 
tariff and that it could stimulate non-competitive 
behaviour among traders and introduces incentives to 
collusive arrangements in order to get the main part of 
the preferences rent. In this field, Chemnitz and 
Grethe [4] discuss the organisation of the Moroccan 
tomato exporter sector, stating that there is a relatively 
high degree of collusion to appropriate the “EP quota 
rent”. 
This rent exists because, in several cases, SMCs 
have agreed in their Association Agreements a 
reduction of the trigger EPs. This reduced EP is both 
country and product specific and usually applies only 
for a certain quantity of product -labelled entry price 
quota. The reduced EP represents a trade advantage 
for preference-receiver countries, additional to the 
tariff exemption granted also in these cases. The Table 
1 summarises the cases where reduced EPs are 
currently in force. 
III. THE MONETARY VALUE OF PREFERENCES 
Preferential exporters can take advantage of the 
reduction of EP through two alternatives (or a 
combination of them) [5]: a product with the same 
border price as a MFN product can be sold at EU 
markets cheaper than its competitors, increasing 
market share, or, alternatively, a product sold in 
destination markets at the same price as a MFN 
product represents higher price received by 
preferential exporters. Hence, there is a potential 
economic transfer to the preference-receiver countries 
stemming from the tariffs forgone by the donor 
country . 
Among the three alternative strands existing to 
assess the impact of preferences, one corresponds to 
the indicators based on actual trade flows –being the 
other two the ex post econometric analysis and the ex 
ante simulation models [6]. One of these indicators is 
the Value of Preference Margin (VPM). By definition, 
it is the difference in prices received by preferential 
and non-preferential exporters multiplied by the 
quantity that is exported under these conditions, as 
equation (1) shows. 
Table 1 Products to which a reduced entry price applies 
 
Source: Commission Regulation (EC) No 1549/2006 and Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements 
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 where, “PP” is the price received by preferential 
exporters, “PMFN” is the price received by MFN 
exporters and “qP” is the quantity exported by the 
preferential country. 
  When there are reduced EPs, Martinez [7] 
proposes that the indicator can be calculated as in (2). 
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 where, “si” indicate specific tariffs, “di” indicate 
ad valorem tariffs, and “ti” are the ad valorem 
equivalents (AVE) for the whole measure. 
  In (2), three addends appear. The first corresponds 
to the gain due to the specific tariff cut, which in turn 
is caused by the reduced trigger EP. This addend is 
labelled as the specific gain. The second addend is 
labelled as the ad valorem gain, since it is due to the 
ad valorem tariff reduction granted. A third addend or   3 
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interaction term corresponds to the preference margin 
rate [8] for the AVEs multiplied by the preferential 
trade value weighted by the MFN ad valorem tariff. 
  This interaction diminishes the VPM since it is 
preceded by a negative sign, and appears as it is not 
possible to fully disentangle the two different tariff 
components of the whole EP system. For comparison 
purposes, in the next sections we will distribute this 
addend in the other two addends proportionally to 
their respective values. 
IV. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION  
As shown in section II, the EU seems reluctant to 
reduce EPs for SMCs since there are few cases when 
this concession holds. Then, one might presume that 
the reduced EP is of utmost relevance in monetary 
terms as tariff revenue forgone and/or as protective 
measure of domestic producers. The indicator 
presented above might be useful to properly assess the 
extent of the concession and also to compare the 
relevance of the reduced EP relative to the ad valorem 
tariff cut. 
Data on trade flows (EU-25 extra imports) have 
been gathered from COMEXT, using the average 
values for the marketing years 2005/2006 and 
2006/2007 as quantities and values traded.
1 If actual 
trade flows are greater than the EP quotas, we have 
considered these quotas as the quantities traded, also 
adjusting proportionally the trade values reported. 
The periods of preferences indicated in table 1 have 
been split into shorter periods, because of sudden 
changes in border prices from EU partners and also 
due to changes in the trigger EP levels. Therefore, 
monthly (or shorter) periods are the base of the 
analysis. As it will be shown in the next paragraphs, 
this period-by-period procedure is necessary to 
identify different patterns in the use of trade 
preferences over a marketing year in the same product. 
With regard to border prices, daily Standard Import 
Values (SIVs) from the preferential partners have been 
collected from TARIC database for the same periods, 
and their period averages have been calculated and 
                                                           
1 In the case of Jordan, preferential EP were in force since January 
2006, and therefore trade data belonging to the beginning of the 
marketing year 2005/2006 have not been considered. 
used as proxies for the border prices.
2 As the VPM 
indicator assumes that rents are fully accrued by 
exporters, it is assumed that these border prices and 
SIVs are the prices received by SMCs exporters. 
For sections IV and V, the main results for each one 
of the products and countries are discussed, and 
because of extent constraints, only figures for the most 
relevant cases are shown. The rest of the results are 
available upon author’s request. 
A. Morocco 
As is shown in the Table 2, potential transfers to 
Morocco are mostly concentrated in tomatoes and, in a 
lesser extent, in clementines and oranges. Overall, 
they account for 68.2 million Euros. 
Table 2 VPMEP for Morocco 
 
Source: Calculations based on Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1549/2006, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and COMEXT as well as 
TARIC data 
For fresh tomatoes, the reduced EP is of utmost 
relevance: while the total tariff revenue forgone by the 
EU accounts for more than 50 million Euros, more 
than 40 million correspond to the specific gain and 
close to 10 million are due to the ad valorem tariff 
exoneration. Total transfer accounts for over 40% of 
the value of trade for this product within EP monthly 
quotas. 
The relevant value of the specific gain is due to the 
fact that, out of 10 periods in the marketing year, in 7 
of them no specific tariff was paid with the 
preferential treatment and the MTE should have been 
paid if Moroccan products were treated as MFN.
3 
                                                           
2 In some periods, no SIVs were reported, so that the unit value has 
been used as a proxy of the border prices. 
3 It may be worthwhile to stress the fact that for the calculations 
carried out, it is assumed a naïve behaviour of traders, so that for 
the calculation of the tariff to be paid only the possibility of the   4 
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Table 3 shows the period-by-period numeric results 
for this case. 
Table 3 Period-by-period VPMEP for Moroccan tomatoes 
(€). 
 
Source: Calculations based on Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1549/2006, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and COMEXT as well as 
TARIC data 
Also one may stress the fact that no specific gain is 
happening in two periods, since border prices are so 
that the same specific tariff should be paid under MFN 
and preferential treatment. In November, border prices 
are below 92% of the preferential EP, paying then all 
the MTE, while in the first fortnight of May, Morocco 
does not experience any gain from the reduced EP 
since its border prices are above MFN trigger EP. 
In the case of cucumbers, the potential transfer 
accounts for about 25% of the value of actual trade. 
Noteworthy is mentioning that the weight of the two 
concessions is balanced (43% and 56%), out of less 
than 1 million Euros. 
For artichokes, the concessions granted by the EU 
are of minor practical incidence since the total tariff 
revenue forgone accounts for less than 4,000 Euros, 
below 40% of the value of trade. Among them, the 
reduced EP accounts for about three quarters of 
potential transfer. 
For courgettes, potential transfer accounts only for 
about 11% of the value of trade within EP quota. 
                                                                                                  
classification of the products according to the SIV is taken into 
account. In fact, this is a simplification adopted to illustrate the 
less favourable case for traders in tariff terms, since under these 
situations of high specific tariffs expected quite often traders 
would prefer to be levied under the other two alternatives that the 
EP Regulation allows for this purpose and give them more leeway. 
These other alternatives for calculating the entry price of every 
shipment are i) the fob price of the products in their country of 
origin plus the costs of insurance and freight up to the EU borders, 
or ii) the customs value minus the duty. 
Within this transfer, the incidence of the reduced EP is 
minor, being the ad valorem tariff abolition the main 
concession. In fact, only in one period border prices of 
Moroccan courgettes take advantage of the reduced 
EP. 
In the case of oranges, transfers also account for 
about 11% of the value of trade. The most remarkable 
fact is that Morocco is not taking any advantage from 
the reduced EP, since it never undercuts MFN trigger 
EP. Total transfer accounts for about 5 million Euros, 
with the greater gains happening from January to 
April, as Table 4 shows. 
Table 4 Period-by-period VPMEP for Moroccan oranges 
(€). 
 
Source: Calculations based on Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1549/2006, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and COMEXT as well as 
TARIC data 
For clementines, preferences account for over 9 
million Euros, that is over 16% of the value of trade. 
Within them, the specific gain has a slight share, since 
only in one period Moroccan border prices are below 
MFN EP and above the preferential EP. Table 5 
depicts the results of the calculations. 
Table 5 Period-by-period VPMEP for Moroccan 
clementines (€). 
 
Source: Calculations based on Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1549/2006, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and COMEXT as well as 
TARIC data   5 
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B. Jordan 
For this country, the current reduced EPs entered 
into force on 1st January 2006. This relative newness 
of the preferences for Jordanian exporters might 
explain a low degree of utilisation of the reduced EPs 
in some products; this guess may be supported by the 
fact that there are no reported imports from Jordan 
during the periods of reduced EPs for three products: 
artichokes, oranges and clementines. The coming 
marketing years may be helpful to determine the 
utilisation rate of these preferential regimes. 
As happened with Moroccan tomatoes, the majority 
of potential transfers to Jordan are concentrated on 
tomatoes. In this product, another similarity with 
Morocco is that the relevance of the reduced EP is 
crucial. As a matter of fact, in spite that border prices 
are simultaneously below the 92% of the MFN EP and 
above the preferential EP in only two periods, the 
gains are quite relevant compared to the ad valorem 
gains. Table 6 summarises the results of the 
calculations carried out. 
Table 6 Period-by-period VPMEP for Jordanian tomatoes 
(€). 
 
Source: Calculations based on Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1549/2006, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and COMEXT as well as 
TARIC data 
For cucumbers, no specific gain appears since 
Jordan never undercuts MFN trigger EP. Instead, all 
the gain stems from the ad valorem tariff exemption. 
The gain accounts for less than 100,000 Euros, that is 
about 11% of the value of trade. 
With regard to courgettes, tariff revenue forgone by 
the EU amounts up to 11,000 Euros, which is 12% of 
total value of trade in this product. The reduced EP is 
only practically relevant in one period, when 
Jordanian courgettes have a border price at the EU 
about 95% of MFN trigger EP. 
C. Egypt 
As mentioned before, only oranges have been 
granted reduced EP for this country under the current 
Euro- Mediterranean Agreement. Since Egypt border 
prices are always above the MFN trigger EP, the 
concession seems to be irrelevant. A second point to 
stress is the fact that the EP quota is exhausted very 
soon in the marketing year. Third, the (only ad 
valorem) tariff revenue forgone by the EU for this 
quota accounts for over 2 million Euros. 
D. Israel 
As for Egypt, only oranges  have been granted 
reduced EP under the current preferences. Also, border 
prices of oranges from Israel are always well above 
the MFN trigger EP, so the reduced EP has little 
relevance in practical terms. Unlike the previous case, 
the EP quota is far from being binding. The VPMEP 
accounts for about 12% of the value of trade. 
V. THE EROSION OF TRADE PREFERENCES 
The change in the value of preference margin has 
been used as an indicator of the erosion of preferences, 
being the seminal work made by Yamazaki [9]. A 
more recent example can be found in Bureau et al. 
[10], while several articles concerning this issue for 
SMCs have been made by Tangermann and Grethe 
working group (see, for example, [5] and [11]). 
A. Definition of scenarios 
Two scenarios are defined to represent alternative 
outcomes of the multilateral trade talks concerning the 
EP system. In spite that no document has been 
circulated regarding this specific issue, we are 
assuming that the EU would include them as 
“sensitive products” with regard to the agreed tariff 
cut. 
This tariff cut is being defined departing from the 
Falconer’s documents sent on January 2008 to prepare 
the draft "modalities" paper. From them, we assume 
that the general tariff reduction will be 50%, and the 
EU is using the permitted leeway for sensitive   6 
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products, so actual tariff reduction for EP products is 
being 25%.
4 
Thus, according to the ideas considered by Antón 
and Atance [13], we are defining two scenarios: 
scenario 1 consists on a 25% MTE and ad valorem 
tariff reduction, without changes in current trigger 
EPs. Scenario 2 adds to the previous cuts a 25% 
reduction of the current trigger EPs. The Agreements 
with Jordan and Morocco indicate that, if bound EPs 
are lowered as results of a WTO agreement, 
preferential EPs shall be lowered in the same 
percentage. We have extended these provisions to 
Egypt and Israel. 
B. Results 
Table 7 shows that there is a clear erosion of 
preferences between the current situation and the two 
scenarios: for Morocco, the total VPMEP passes from 
68.2 million Euros to 52.2 million Euros in scenario 1 
and 42.2 million Euros in scenario 2. For Jordan, total 
current VPMEP is 240,800 Euros and drops to 184,600 
and 155,500 under the two alternatives. Egypt loses 
0.5 million Euros and Israel loses 0.3 million Euros.
5 
Table 7 Erosion of preferences under the two scenarios. 
Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Israel. VPMEP in € 
 
Source: Calculations based on Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1549/2006, Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and COMEXT as well as 
TARIC data 
                                                           
4 While subsequent modalities papers definitively indicate the 50% 
value as agreed by the negotiators, the 50% value corresponds to 
the average of the range 48-52% reduction for developed countries 
if the AVE equivalent bound tariff is lesser than 20% that is 
proposed in Falconer’s documentation as of January 2008 
available at the time of writing this paper. Our calculations 
indicate that AVE MFN tariffs for the six products ranged between 
12% and 19.9% in the period 2004-2007 (the former percentage 
for oranges and the latter for tomatoes). 
5Notice that for these two countries, in their only product 
(oranges), the MFN trigger EP is never undercut. So, the two 
scenarios yield identical results. 
The comparison of the results for Morocco and 
Jordan in the scenarios 1 and 2 indicates that the 
provision of reducing the preferential EP by the same 
percentage as the MFN trigger EPs is not enough to 
compensate for the erosion of preferences. 
Tangermann [14] discusses the effect of the way in 
which such provisions are expressed concerning the 
relief of the erosion effects for specific tariffs. The 
aforementioned clause included in the current 
Agreements is among the most protective redactions 
for this purpose; nevertheless, the results indicate that 
in the case of a more complicated system like the EP, 
the clause does not appear to be sufficient. 
In fact, the combined reduction of the trigger EPs 
and of the MTE that affect the specific gain of the 
VPMEP may be somehow intriguing with a fixed 
structure of border prices. In almost all of the 
products, the specific gain is greater in the scenario 1 
than in scenario 2.
6  
In summary, the overall results by country 
demonstrate the higher erosion of preferences in 
scenario 2 than in scenario 1. Summarizing the results 
for Moroccan tomatoes, the outstanding fact is the big 
loss happening to the specific gain: passes from 40.4 
million Euros to 30.6 million Euros in scenario 1 and 
to 22.3 million Euros in scenario 2. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have used a method to assess the 
value of the preferences that involve reduced EPs. 
This method allows the direct comparison of the 
reduction of the specific component of the tariff –in 
turn linked with the reduced trigger EPs- with the 
reduction of the ad valorem tariff. 
When applying this methodology to the cases when 
the EU has granted reduced EPs, the main fact is that 
Morocco benefits substantially among the SMCs 
concerned.  
                                                           
6 The exception are Moroccan cucumbers (April), when the 
lowering of the MFN EP causes the “saving” of a specific tariff 
that did not appear in the scenario 1. Additionally to the previous 
comment, the interaction term also may vary in the opposite 
direction of the erosion of preferences, because of the lowering of 
the AVEs, becoming less straightforward the comparison of the 
scenarios.   7 
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Regarding to products, in many of them there is 
little degree of utilisation of such a priori relevant 
preference. Contrariwise, the more frequent ad 
valorem tariff elimination remains very relevant. 
There is only one case where the reduced EP means 
a significant potential transfer to the preference-
receiver country. That is the case of Moroccan 
tomatoes: nowadays, about 40 million Euros are 
transferred by the EU in terms of tariff revenue 
forgone only in this product; also, the reduced EP is 
the dominant preference among the two existing in 
this product. 
In monetary terms, the reduced EP is crucial also 
for Moroccan clementines, but its significance lowers 
in relative terms.  Other interesting fact is that the 
reduced EP for oranges is absolutely irrelevant in 
practical terms for the SMCs that enjoy it. 
Regarding the erosion of preferences for SMCs 
after changes in the EP system, the first conclusion is 
to notice that the VPMEP is reduced by (close to) the 
same percentage as the ad valorem tariffs and the 
MTE if the trigger EPs are kept as currently. But if the 
trigger EPs are also lowered, the erosion is much 
greater in overall terms for the countries that make use 
of the reduced EPs. Thus, the anti-erosion clause 
agreed is not sufficient to overcome such lowering in 
potential transfers. 
From these findings, two main comments arise. One 
refers to the interest of SMCs in keeping current 
trigger EPs, interest that could be different according 
to the product at stake. In the case of tomatoes, 
probably the maintenance of the system and of the 
current trigger EPs might be preferred by these 
exporters.  
A second comment refers to the possibility of re-
negotiations of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements 
depending on the changes implemented on the EP 
system.  
Finally, two tasks remain ahead after this analysis. 
The first is to explore other likely outcomes of the 
changes in the EP system: one could be the 
elimination of the system, another could be to 
implement a “normal” product treatment regarding the 
cuts agreed. As well, deeper analysis of the three 
alternative levels of tariff reduction for sensitive 
products and the treatment of subsequent quotas may 
deserve a thorough analysis. 
The second task ahead is to investigate about the 
underutilisation of the reduced EPs: one may guess 
about rigidities in the cost structures in the production 
and exportation of certain products such as oranges, 
also the relative newness of the measure could explain 
why Jordan does not take much advantage of it. This 
type of investigation would require deeper research in 
the empirical side.  
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